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A Critical Account of the Place of Divine
Relations in the Theology of Vladimir Lossky
Deborah L. CasewellQ1
Vladimir Lossky has proven to be an influential theologian in the 20th
century, shaping modern Orthodox theology and challenging Western
thought. Key to his thought is how he interrelates the Trinity with
apophaticism and the distinction he makes between the essences and
energies of God. In doing so he critiques a Western view of the Trin-
ity as found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.Thus, given that he
defines theology as complementary to mysticism, and since partici-
pation in the energies of the Trinity in deification is the goal of his
theology, I shall engage in a critical account of whether his modern
Orthodox Trinitarian theology enables him to express the reality of
human participation in God or not. I note, as Rowan Williams does in
an unpublished thesis, that when discussing the Trinity in Orthodox
thought this appears to be ‘a doctrine which is the most radically
inaccessible of all to the speculations of the discursive reason, the
most totally given of dogmas’.1 Thus I shall be looking closely at
how Lossky’s ‘understanding of theology as “apophatic” . . . is the
regulating rule in his trinitarian theology and the understanding of
trinitarian categories, such as nature and person’, and how ‘it is also
the lens through which he views the filioque’.2
The Trinitarian thought of Lossky and Aquinas
Lossky’s Trinitarian thought is best expounded in The Mystical The-
ology of the Eastern Church. He posits relations in God as simply
those of origin, based on Cappadocian theology, rather than Aquinas’
notion of relations of opposition which are developed from their ori-
gin. This is illustrated by Gregory Nazianzen who states ‘it is the
name of the relation in which the Father stands to the Son, and the
1 Rowan Williams, The theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky: an exposition and
critique, (University of Oxford. Faculty of Theology. Thesis (D.Phil.)–University of Oxford,
1975), p.85.
2 Aristotle Papanikolaou, Being with God, Trinity, apophaticism, and divine-human
communion, (Notre Dame: UNDPress, 2006), p.50.
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2 A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology
Son to the Father. For as with us these names make known a gen-
uine and intimate relation, so in the case before us too they denote an
identity of nature between him that is begotten and him that begets’.3
Lossky develops this way of thinking in contrast to the thought of
Thomas Aquinas as posited in his Summa Theologicae.
The key part of Aquinas that Lossky disagrees with is his use of
the relations of opposition in regard to the relation of origins, used
in affirming the filioque. In Aquinas, relations in God are based on
movement within the divine nature, where the unity is affirmed as the
principle of the Trinity, rather than the diversity of the hypostases.
The four relations of opposition are that of fatherhood, sonship, spi-
ration and procession. For ‘all that exists in God is one with the
divine nature. So then it is not by considering this unity we can draw
the distinction between what is characteristic of this or that proces-
sion; rather in order to conceive the specific character of this or that
procession we must consider the relatedness of one procession to
another’.4 Thus Aquinas writes that ‘although strictly speaking, rela-
tions do not originate or proceed from one another, nevertheless we
take them as opposed because of the procession of one thing from
another’.5 Thus for Aquinas, the relations of opposition guarantee
the unity of the Trinity against seeing the persons as separate: dis-
tinction in God arises only through the relation of origin. However,
a relation in God is not as an accidental entity in a subject, but
is the divine nature itself; therefore it is something subsisting just
as the divine nature does, hence ‘divine person signifies relation as
something subsisting’,6 that is, relation is a hypostasis subsisting in
the divine nature, and what is subsisting in the divine nature can be
nothing other than the divine nature itself, namely divine substance
(ST 1a 29 4). This depends on the unity of the divine substance,
which Lossky critiques as representative of unity overriding diversity
in the trinitarian relations.
LaCugna notes that ‘Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of God is fre-
quently held out as the paradigm instance of the separation of the-
ologia from oikonomia’,7 although I am going to suggest later that at
first glance his account does not seem so different from the distinc-
tion between essence and energies. In fact, Lacugna affirms the idea
that the relations in God are based on movement within the divine
nature, as
3 [29:16] The Theological Orations, in Christology of the Later Fathers, ed. Hardy,
(London: SCM Press, 1954), p.171.
4 Summa Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Gilby (London: Blackfriars, 1964-68),
ST 1a 27:4.
5 ST 1a 28:3.
6 ST 1a 29:4.
7 Catherine LaCugna, God For Us, (USA: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), p.145.
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A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology 3
according to Thomas, real relations in God are based on action, that
is, activity immanent in God, not actions outside God such as creation.
Thus the divine persons are distinguished by the two processions,
being begotten and being spirated, which produce four real relations:
(fatherhood, sonship, spiration, procession).8
However, although LaCugna argues that this stress on action in God
is welcome and his links between the economic and immanent Trinity
are helpful, she maintains that unlike her, he emphasises the imma-
nent rather than economic Trinity, as ‘names pertaining to the Trinity
derive from God’s nature, not from God’s self-revelation in the econ-
omy. The names Father, Son, and Spirit express not God’s relation
to the creature but intradivine relations’.9
Starting from this unity rather than from the hypostases and their
origin is contrary to the methodology of Lossky. For, as Gregory
Nazianzen, from whom Lossky takes much of his trinitarian thought,
says, the ousia ‘no man ever yet has discovered or can discover’,10
and this is why ‘the begetting of God must be honoured by si-
lence . . . it was in a manner known to the Father who begot, and to
the Son who was begotten. Anything more than this is hidden by a
cloud, and escapes your dim sight’.11
Thus Lossky claims that
the only characteristic of the hypostases which we can state to be ex-
clusively proper to each, and which is never found in orders, by reason
of their consubstantiality is thus the relation of origin. Nevertheless,
this relation must be understood in an apophatic sense. It is above all
a negation, showing us that the Father is neither the Son nor the Holy
Spirit, that the Son is neither the Father nor the Spirit; that the Holy
Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son. Otherwise to regard it would
be to submit the Trinity to a category of Aristotelian logic, that of
relation. Understood apophatically, the relation of origin descries the
difference but nevertheless does not indicate the manner of the divine
processions.12
However, there may be not such a great disagreement on terminology
between Thomas and Lossky after all. Williams offers:
a final note on the detail of Thomas’s argument: as is well-known,
he defines the divine persons as ‘subsistent relations’, a term that
has puzzled many modern theologians. It derives from the vocabu-
lary of Augustine, but Thomas gives it a more precise technical twist,
8 LaCugna, p.154.
9 LaCugna, p.157.
10 [28:17], The Theological Orations, p.147.
11 [29:8], The Theological Orations, p.165.
12 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, (NY: St. Vladimirs
Seminary Press, 1976), pp.54-5.
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4 A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology
so much so that a not very sympathetic Eastern Orthodox commen-
tator, Vladimir Lossky, can accuse him of simply identifying person
with relation, and thus evacuating any content for the persons as real
agents.13
Although it could be said that Lossky should take a more apophatic
view of Aquinas’ theology, as Rowan Williams suggests, stating that
‘the language of subsistent relations is simply a way of saying that
the actual reality of the “essence” (what it’s like to be God) is nothing
other than the threefold pattern of relation that we begin to grasp if
we put together the history of revelation and the logic of considering
God’s life as “intellectual”, in some sense self-aware.’14
This leads into Lossky’s critique of the filioque as he prefers re-
lations of origin that are not tied to relations of opposition, for ac-
cording to him even if relations of opposition are based on relations
of origin, they are intended to show opposition in the nature of
the one God. For Lossky, this involves seeing the Godhead as one
essence/substance rather than 3 distinct hypostases. In this subordi-
nation of the persons to the substance Lossky sees a loss of the place
of the Father as the source of the Trinity, losing the monarchy of the
Father and thus affecting the generation and procession of the Son
and Spirit. Lossky states that
the Greeks saw in the formula of the procession of the Holy Spirit
from the Father and the Son a tendency to stress the unity of nature
at the expense of the real distinction between the persons. The
relationships of origin which do not bring the Son and Spirit back to
the unique source, to the Father – the one as begotten, the other as
proceeding – become a system of relationships within one essence:
something logically posterior to the essence.15
Furthermore, he sees this as a sign that ‘the West had already lost
the true idea of the Person of the Holy Spirit, relegating Him to a
secondary position by making Him into a kind of lieutenant or deputy
of the Son’.16
Thus for Lossky, in Western thought the hypostatic characteristics
(paternity, generation, procession) are swallowed up in the essence
where ‘the principle of unity within the Trinity, these relationships,
instead of being characteristics of the hypostases, are identified with
them’.17 This Lossky sees as unnecessary, as ‘these two persons are
13 Rowan Williams, ‘What does love know? St Thomas on the Trinity’, New Blackfriars,
2001, Vol.82 (964), pp.260-272, p.267.
14 Williams, p.268.
15 Vladimir Lossky, Mystical Theology, p.57.
16 Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, (NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press,
1985), p.103.
17 Lossky, Mystical Theology, p.57.
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A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology 5
distinguished by the different mode of their origin: the Son is begot-
ten, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. This is sufficient to
distinguish them’.18 He continues ‘as St. Thomas was later to write:
“Persona est relatio”, inner relationship of the essence which it di-
versifies. It can scarcely be denied that there is a difference between
this Trinitarian conception and that of Gregory Nazianzen with his
“Thrice-repeated Holy, meeting in one ascription of the title Lord
and God”’.19 However, as Williams notes, this is not actually what
Aquinas is saying, for ‘Aquinas nowhere says Persona est relatio (as
Lossky alleges) . . . his discussion in S.T., I.29, iv turns upon whether
persona refers to the divine nature or not, and he concludes that . . . in
discourse about God, “person” designates something distinct by virtue
of relation of origin and subsisting as a really distinct hypostasis of
the divine nature’.20 For Aquinas, person ‘signifying’ relation has an
apophatic quality to it that you would think Lossky would welcome.
Furthermore, Lossky’s objection might be answered by rooting both
the diversity and reality of the persons in movement within the di-
vine nature. Nevertheless, does this fundamental misunderstanding of
Aquinas’ theology invalidate Lossky’s criticisms?
As stated above, Lossky fears that this emphasis on the unity
exists at the expense of the monarchy of the Father, for ‘the Greek
Fathers always maintained that the principle of unity in the Trinity
is the person of the father . . . he lays down their relations of origin –
generation and procession – in regard to the unique principle of
Godhead. This is why the East has always opposed the formula
of filioque which seems to impair the monarchy of the Father’.21
However, like LaCugna, Williams sees Aquinas’ Trinitarian thought
as emphasising the dynamic action within the unity of God, for
God loves God, loves what is understood in the eternal Word, loves
the always pre-existing self-giving of the Father . . . God is a movement
towards God, God’s wanting of God so that God may be fully and
blissfully God, may enjoy the ‘natural good’ proper to divine nature.22
This is taken from Aquinas’ remarks that ‘what proceeds in God as
love does not proceed as Begotten or Son, but rather as Spirit. This
word implies vital movement and impulse, in the sense that man is
said to be driven or impelled by love to do this or that’.23
Williams notes that for Lossky it is
18 Lossky, p.55.
19 Lossky, p.57.
20 Williams, The theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky, p.150.
21 Lossky, p.58.
22 Williams, ‘What does love know?’, p.265.
23 ST 1a 27:4.
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6 A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology
bad enough that the persons should be thus reduced to relations; worse
still that these should be relationes oppositionis, relations of logi-
cal opposition and mutual exclusiveness between two terms. What is
left of the pattern of purely personal relations between all three per-
sons, dependent upon the “self-transcending” love of the Father in His
“monarchy”?24
However, in the light of his own analysis of relations in Aquinas,
Williams judges that the thought of Lossky is in fact ‘a profoundly
reactionary, regressive approach. It fails to advance beyond the
homoousios of Nicaea, remaining on the level of discourse about
substantial unity’25, whereas in Aquinas his ‘interpretation of persona
represents a very important advance in terminological precision,
decisively removing the ambiguities associated with a term like
hypostasis’.26
Thus, Williams states that Lossky’s complaint about the scholastic
understanding of hypostasis
is largely invalidated by the fact, which he ignores, of the greater ter-
minological complexity and precision of Latin theology, which allowed
Aquinas to distinguish clearly between hypostasis in its common Greek
metaphysical or ontological sense (meaning atomon), and hypostasis
in its theological (Trinitarian and Christological) usage, and to begin
to make explicit the latent “personalist” corollaries of this latter us-
age. The understanding which emerges is one which does allow for a
measure of real trinitarian pluralism.27
However, Williams also appears to claim that dialogue between the
two understandings is difficult, as one would never appreciate the
nuances of the other, for ‘in an important sense, it does not matter
if Aquinas’s terminology is patient of an interpretation congenial to
Lossky, since there remains a fundamental difference in what they
regard as the proper starting-point for theology.’28 For example, I
suggest that if one starts from the three hypostases and sees relations
as the consequences of having these three hypostases (as in Gregory
Nazianzen’s analogies of three suns intermingled and Peter, Paul and
James, and Gregory of Nyssa’s tract “On Not Three Gods”), the
Trinity is subject to the same criticisms of insularity that Lossky
lays at Western theology. The relations in Lossky’s theology are so
focused on each other that they do not exist as a working out in the
world but as that amongst each other; they do not lead to a greater
capacity of openness in the world but instead turn back in amongst
24 Williams, The theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky, p.135.
25 Williams, p.136.
26 Williams, p.152.
27 Williams, p.154.
28 Williams, p.155.
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A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology 7
themselves. This leads to a greater division between the theologia
and oikonomia than would be found in Western thought.
This has an impact on the filioque, for if there is a deep separation
between God in Godself and God in the world, then the filioque
could only apply to the latter. However, another important part of
Lossky’s critique is that ‘the work of the lifegiving Spirit is obscured
by His supposed subordination to the Son, and the omnipresence
of God’s glory in His world is obscured by the rejection of the
divine energies’.29 The filioque for Lossky does three irredeemable
things. It decreases the personalism of God; lessens the efficacy of
the apophatic approach and does not operate with the divine ener-
gies. It removes devotion from theology, as Williams notes that for
Lossky ‘“Filioquisme” negates the apophatic attitude, and capitulates
to the seductions of philosophy’.30 Instead, having the Son being
‘generated’ and the Spirit ‘processing’ ensures that
the balance between the hypostases and the ousia is safeguarded. If
the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father ‘and from the Son’ (filioque)
as from one single principle, essential unity takes precedence over
personal diversity, and the Persons become relations of the essence,
differentiating themselves from one another by mutual opposition.31
In having this double procession
the unity of God is no longer a personal principle but an intellectual
construct. Properly, the divine simplicity (itself a philosophical rather
than a religious notion, and so of secondary importance) is a matter
of the perfect unity of the Trinity in the monarchy of the Father:
scholasticism, in refusing to distinguish between essence and energy,
does away with the freedom of God, His capacity to “transcend His
transcendence” and go out from His essence in relation.32
I suggest, then, that Lossky’s rejection of the filioque can only be
properly considered in the wider context of the distinction between
essence and energies, to which we now turn.
Essence and Energies
According to Lossky, in Orthodox theology, ‘God manifests Himself
by His operations or energies’33 that are separate from God’s essence
which remains hidden in the cloud of unknowing. Lossky here relies
on the theology of Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory Palamas, clarifying
that ‘essence and energies are not, for Palamas, two parts of God,
29 Williams, p.132.
30 Williams, p.132.
31 Lossky, Image and Likeness, p.88.
32 Williams, p.159.
33 Lossky, The Vision of God, (NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997), p.78.
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8 A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology
as some modern critics still imagine, but two different modes of the
existence of God, within His nature and outside His nature; the same
God remains totally inaccessible in his essence – and communicates
himself totally by grace’.34 In doing so he reveals the importance of
tradition, again tracing his thought back to the Fathers, who ‘affirmed
from the beginning a distinction between God’s unknowable essence
and God’s energies through which a real communion with God is
possible.’35 As Lossky states ‘it was the need to establish a dogmatic
basis for union with God which impelled the Eastern Church to
formulate her teaching on the distinction between God’s essence and
His energies’.36
This is part of the separation between God and the world, between
the transcendent essence, as ‘in creation the consubstantial Trinity
makes itself known in the energies proper to its nature’.37 These
energies are ‘the outpourings of the divine nature which cannot set
bounds to itself, for God is more than essence. The energies might
be described as that mode of existence of the Trinity which is outside
of its inaccessible essence. God thus exists both in His essence and
outside of His essence’.38
However, this movement outward is distinct from what occurs
within the Trinity as ‘the Son and the Holy Spirit are, so to say,
personal processions, and the energies natural processions. The en-
ergies are inseparable from the nature, and the nature is inseparable
from the three Persons’.39 Furthermore this is the only way in which
humanity can know God, for ‘this doctrine makes it possible to un-
derstand how the trinity can remain incommunicable in essence and
at the same time come and dwell within us, according to the promise
of Christ’.40
As noted above, this distinction preserves the reliance on apophati-
cism within Lossky’s theology. Lossky sees apophaticism as ‘a way
towards mystical union with God, whose nature remains incompre-
hensible to us’.41 He notes that regarding knowledge of God
in contemplating any object we analyse its properties: it is this which
enables us to form concepts. But this analysis can in no case exhaust
the content of the object of perception. There will always remain
34 Lossky, p.157.
35 Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Divine energies or divine personhood: Vladimir Lossky and
John Zizoulas on conceiving the transcendent and immanent God.” Modern Theology 19,
no. 3 (2003): 357-385. p.357.
36 Lossky, Mystical Theology, p.71.
37 Lossky, p.72
38 Lossky, p.73.
39 Lossky, p.86.
40 Lossky, p.86.
41 Lossky, p.28.
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A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology 9
an “irrational residue” which escapes analysis and which cannot be
expressed in concepts; it is the unknowable depth of things, that which
constitutes their true, indefinable essence. In regard to God, these reveal
his energies which descend towards us yet do not draw us closer to
his essence, which is inaccessible.42
The importance of apophaticism within Lossky’s theology is that
it is a key part of his methodology: ‘apophaticism . . . is, above all,
an attitude of mind which refuses to form concepts about God’.43
This is why Papanikolaou notes that ‘apophasis is never, for Lossky,
a move in a conceptual game, bound up as it is with metanoia
of the intellect, and indeed, not only of the intellect, bound up
as it is with the metanoia of the whole human person’.44 It is, as
Chrestos claims ‘our refusal to exhaust knowledge of the truth in
its formulations’.45 As discussed below, this metanoia present in
Lossky’s thought stands in contrast to what he perceives as the
over-philosophising of Western thought, ‘to Lossky, the problem
with the intellectualisation of theology is that it precludes real union
with God, the goal of all theological discourse in the Incarnation’.46
However, as Papanikolaou further notes ‘the problem for Lossky is
that he does not have the conceptual apparatus to link his theological
notion of person with his apophaticism, primarily because of the
priority given to apophaticism in theological method’.47
Papanikolaou sees further problems in Lossky’s apophaticism, as
affirming an unknown essence, distinct from energies, undermines
the argument for the monarchia and personality of the Father, and
thus this hyperessence comes close to a western idea of prior unity
of substance. Thus, if the distinction of essence from energies under-
mines the personality of the Father, it also undermines the difference
in relations that Lossky wants to establish through reflections on ori-
gins, and thus a problem lies with Lossky’s objection to Aquinas’
attempt to comprehend the how as well as the why of the Trinitarian
relations. Lossky
rejects any speculation on the “how” of relations in the Trinity for
fear of making hypostatic diversity depend on some thing. Ironically,
this rejection runs the risk of depersonalisation, the one thing Lossky
sought to avoid. The Father as the source of the Trinity implies a rich
42 Lossky, p.33.
43 Lossky, p.39.
44 Papanikolaou
45 Giannaras Chrestos, Elements of faith: an introduction to Orthodox theology. (Edin-
burgh: T.&T. Clark, 1991), p.17.
46 Papanikolaou, Being with God, p.29.
47 Papanikolaou, p.92.
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10 A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology
concept of person as freedom and love, one which Lossky himself
attempted to clarify later in his career.48
Lossky notes that this link between apophaticism and energies is im-
possible in any other theology, as ‘it became impossible for Roman
Catholic theologians to admit the energetic manifestation of the Trin-
ity as something not contradicting the truth of divine simplicity’.49
However, the advantage is not always with Lossky, for Papanikolaou
notes that
There is a confusion in Lossky’s doctrine of God which results from
attempting to affirm simultaneously a transcendent and immanent God
based on the essence/energies distinction, and a Triune God whose
diversity is rooted in the monarchia of the Father. To affirm, as Lossky
does, that one cannot speak of God in the realm of theologia, that God
in Godself is shrouded in apophaticism, is, ironically, to continue to
make “essence” language primary in Godtalk . . . one cannot speak of
God as Trinity other than to express it as a “primordial fact”’.50
For Lossky the Western lack of apophaticism also ties into his dissat-
isfaction with the filioque as he ‘sees a peculiarly close link between
the Holy Spirit and the divine energies. In the economy of grace, it
is the Spirit who realizes in the created world the activity of God’.51
The crux of the matter for Lossky is that the essence of the Trinity
should not be so open to our thought, the whole concept instead
should be ‘a cross for human ways of thought. The apophatic ascent
is a mounting of Calvary’,52 it should be experienced and participated
in, not philosophised over as he sees it to be in Western theology.
As Lossky states regarding the reasoning behind the filioque, ‘one
has the impression that the heights of theology have been deserted
in order to descend to the level of religious philosophy’.53
Participation
Lossky sees western theologians as neglecting an important aspect of
being a theologian. In the Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church
Lossky speaks first and foremost of the importance of theology as
mysticism, for ‘the eastern tradition has never made a sharp distinc-
tion between mysticism and theology; between personal experience of
the divine mysteries and the dogma affirmed by the Church’.54 Thus
‘theology must be not so much a quest of positive notions about the
48 Papanikolaou, p.70.
49 Lossky, Image and Likeness, p.96.
50 Papanikolaou, p.377.
51 Williams, The theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky, p.160.
52 Lossky, Mystical Theology, p.66.
53 Lossky, Image and Likeness, p.80.
54 Lossky, Mystical Theology, p.8.
C⃝ 2015 The Dominican Council
nbfr12177 W3G-nbfr.cls September 17, 2015 17:11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
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divine being as an experience which surpasses all understanding’.55
This is especially important for the theologian, as ‘no one who does
not follow the path of union with God can be a theologian’.56
Participation is more than a practice, it is as essential for Lossky’s
methodology as apophaticism is, for ‘in the tradition of the East-
ern Church there is no place for a theology, and even less for a
mysticism, of the divine essence. The goal of Orthodox spiritual-
ity, the blessedness of the Kingdom of Heaven, is not the vision of
the essence, but, above all, a participation in the divine life of the
Holy Trinity’.57 Thus Lossky’s Trinitarian thought is impacted by
participation as it becomes ‘a theology of union, a mystical theology
which appeals to experience, and which presupposes a continuous
and progressive series of changes in created nature, a more and more
intimate communion of the human person with the Holy Trinity’.58
Yet, as noted above, we cannot participate in the essence of God,
therefore the distinction between essence and energies is important
here, for if we were to participate with God in God’s essence, then
we would become God, ‘there would no longer be Trinity, but muri-
hypostatos . . . for he would have as many hypostases as there would
be persons participating in His essence’.59 Therefore, we only par-
ticipate in the energies, which are manifested through the work of
the Spirit. This union is very different from the other unions with
God that Lossky discusses, as ‘the union to which we are called is
neither hypostatic [Christ] . . . nor substantial [Trinity] . . . it is union
with God in His energies, or union by grace making us participate in
the divine nature, without our essence becoming thereby the essence
of God’.60
A correct theology, in Lossky’s eyes, cannot escape from this, as
we are called to participate in the divine nature. We are therefore
compelled to recognize in God an ineffable distinction, other than
that between His essence and His persons, according to which He is,
under different aspects, both totally inaccessible and at the same time
accessible. This distinction is that between the essence of God, or
His nature, properly co-called, which is inaccessible, unknowable and
incommunicable; and the energies or divine operations, forces proper
to and inseparable from God’s essence, in which He goes forth from
Himself, manifests, communicates, and gives Himself.61
55 Lossky, p.38.
56 Lossky, p.39.
57 Lossky, p.65.
58 Lossky, p.67.
59 Lossky, p.70.
60 Lossky, p.87.
61 Lossky, p.70.
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12 A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology
Therefore ‘the doctrine of the energies, ineffably distinct from the
essence, is the dogmatic basis of the real character of all mystical
experience’.62
So whilst for Lossky, participation in the energies ensures that the
world and God are linked, through the deifying work of the Spirit
as first defined in Gregory Nazianzen’s Theological Orations, there
are issues with this train of thought. For if we participate only in
the energies of God, is this not the same as preserving the sharp
distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity, between
theologia and oikonomia that Lossky accuses Western thought of
doing? For if there is this difference between economic and immanent
Trinity, then participation is reduced to being only in the energies not
the essence of God, then we are not really dealing with God when
we speak of energies, not a conscious act within the world but an
afterglow of the glory within the Trinity in itself, but in ‘that mode of
existence of the Trinity which is outside of its inaccessible essence’,63
the light from the three suns, to borrow an image, which does not
exist ‘on account of creatures, despite the fact that it is through His
energies, which penetrate everything that exists, that God creates and
operates’.64 They are in fact understood as ‘subsequent to the essence
and are its natural manifestations, but as external to the very being
of the Trinity’.65 The concepts of Trinity, apophaticism, energies
and essences and participation do not interrelate in Lossky’s thought
perichoretically. Instead, there is too much distinction and separation
in Lossky’s thought, between the immanent and economic Trinity
due to the distinction between essences and energies, between us and
God through apophaticism and the emphasis on participation still
relies on this distinction between God and God, between essences
and energies.
However, in Lossky’s theology he appears to want to have par-
ticipation, apophaticism, essence and energies and a Trinity that is
marked by diversity rather than unity. Yet this bifurcation between
energies and essence prevents participation and the apophaticism en-
tailed by this separation of the essence and energies means that we
have a unity emphasized at the expense of the diversity, despite
Lossky’s criticism of the filioque for doing the very same thing. The
emphasis on the diversity means that the Trinity does not interre-
late within itself as dynamically as it does in Aquinas’ thought. If
Lossky had a more dynamic view of the trinitarian relations, and if
there was not such a division between God in Godself and God as
relating to the world, then that would enable greater participation in
62 Lossky, p.86.
63 Lossky, p.73.
64 Lossky, p.74.
65 Lossly, p.81.
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A Critical Account of the Place of Divine Relations in the Theology 13
God based on movement within God, a movement of like to like. For
all Lossky’s emphasis on participation on our part, there is little talk
about it in God, instead there is the view of the Trinity as absolute
stability, for ‘if the very foundation of created being is change, and
the transition from non-being to being, if a creature is contingent by
nature, the Trinity is an absolute stability’.66
Thus, in examining these key parts of the theology of Vladimir
Lossky, the role that the divine relations plays is supposed to facilitate
these other doctrines, such as the distinction between essence and
energies, apophaticism and participation, but from a close reading of
the interrelation of these doctrines, I have to conclude that this is a
Trinitarian theology that emphasizes the diversity of the persons of
the Trinity whilst not sufficiently expressing their internal coherence.
Such coherence might well be expressed through an idea of internal,
relational movements within the one divine nature which Aquinas
attempts to articulate with concepts of ‘relations of opposition’ and
in the rather apophatic language of ‘subsistent relations’. I should
admit that in raising these criticisms I may in fact be doing what
Lossky criticises certain theologians for doing, ignoring the deep-
seated link between theology and mysticism, and thus whilst there is
much to be discussed with regard to Lossky’s Trinitarian thought, we
may lose sight of the aim of Lossky’s overall thought, which is not to
systematize God, but to promote a deeper understanding of God and
lead us to participate in the energies of the divine Trinity. However,
I would conclude by saying that in order to worship God properly,
one needs a healthy, consistent theology, and Lossky’s Trinitarian
formulations do not offer this.
Deborah L. Casewell
dcasewell@gmail.com
66 Lossky, p.45.
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